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Editorial

Palma Journal's special issue on migration aims at contributing to this area of study in a unique manner. By providing a forum for non-veteran scholars in the field to share their current research findings with a broader public, Palma has joined hands with the Lebanese Emigration Research Center in celebrating LERC's sixth anniversary serving international and interdisciplinary scholarly discourse between Lebanon and the rest of the world.

The migration special issue owes its inception to a conversation between Beirut und Buenos Aires, in which Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous, an Austrian-American researcher at LERC, and the eminent Argentinean migration scholar, Ignacio Klich, developed the idea for a special migration issue and presented it to the LERC research team. This Libano-Austro-Iberian link laid the foundation for an exciting collection of articles, which I have had the privilege to guest edit. The rest of the story is embodied in the volume at hand, made up of six submissions dealing with the various facets of Lebanese migrants' lives and their relations with their country of origin.

Some of the most insightful work currently being undertaken on Lebanese migration is presented here. This volume is made up of two articles on migration history and four on contemporary topics. The first historical piece, Anne Monsour's "*New century, old story! Race, religion, bureaucrats, and the Australian Lebanese story*", provides an overview of the history of Lebanese settlement in Australia and discusses these immigrants encounter with racial classification and discrimination. She starts with the current perception, common in Australian society, that the Lebanese community is somehow linked to rape, riots, and the "war on terror" campaign and maintains that this perception rests on a historically transmitted image that painted the Lebanese pioneers as "undesirables" or "enemy aliens." Mansour asserts that these pioneers attempted to overcome this 'categorization' process by emphasizing their "whiteness" at the expense of their "Eastern" characteristics. She argues that the restrictive Australian migration policies of the past continue to play a significant role in the lives of the Lebanese immigrants today.

The second historical article, "*The Transnational Imagination: XXth century networks and institutions of the Mashreqi migration to Mexico*", by Camila Pastor de Maria y Campos, addresses the issues of networking, institution formation, and role of the Lebanese community in Mexico from its inception until the present. It argues that migration networks and institutions were organized along confessional lines and through colonial ties mainly to the French Mandate, and that, following the founding of nation states in the Middle East, institutions became more sectarian as they became more 'national'. The author reasons that the "shifting boundaries of these networks reflect the overlapping transnational imaginaries and practices of migrants and colonial and

ecclesiastical authorities.” She contends that the Lebanese migrants to Mexico, whose loyalties in the past were cultivated politically and ecclesiastically and who were instrumentalized as transnational entities, were being cultivated and used in a similar manner following the end of the Civil War in Lebanon.

The first among the contemporary articles deals with gender. In “*Balad Niswen – Hukum Niswen: The perception of gender inversions between Lebanon and Australia*” Nelia Hyndman-Rizik addresses the issue of gender roles of male emigrants from the village of Hadchit in North Lebanon now living in Sydney. She maintains that their self-perception has been emasculated by the migration process. On the one hand, they are confronted with racism and subjugation in Australia, as well as with war and violence in their country of origin, about which they can do very little. On the other hand, changes in the roles of women within the immigrant communities, due to the education of their daughters and the participation of their wives in the Australian economy, further threatens the gendered status quo. Hyndman-Rizik found that these men “have come to imagine the Australian state as a matriarchal state, which is “*hukum niswen*”, ruled by women, as symbolized by the Queen of England as the Head of State.

“*Diaspora and E-Commerce: The Globalization of Lebanese Baklava,*” was written by Guita Hourani. The paper argues that new technologies allow small and medium enterprises in developing countries, especially those with “ethnic” or “nostalgic” merchandise, to carve a niche for their products in the international market. Taking e-commerce in baklava production as an example, this study shows how the main producers of this delicacy used ICT to tap into the Lebanese diaspora, as described in “business to diaspora” theory. The paper argues that shipping across international borders has required the producers to comply with international standards and to be creative in packaging and labelling their products. This process has also created the need for Lebanese financial institutions to facilitate credit card payment and verification. In conclusion, a case can be made for the need for a more enabling legal and telecommunication environment in this sector if it is to expand and thrive in the future.

Rita Stephan’s paper, “*Lebanese-Americans’ Identity, Citizenship and Political Behavior*” examines Lebanese-Americans’ political behavior in order to better understand the correlation between identity politics and ethnic minority citizenship. Stephan surveys how Lebanese, and Arab-Americans as a group, identify themselves and how they are identified by US society. She illustrates how the self-identification of Lebanese-Americans varies according to historical, political, ideological and cultural factors, how Lebanese-Americans vote, how they “frame their activism within the Arab-American framework in promoting their hyphenated community’s interest... and [how] Lebanese sovereignty and independence seems to be a common theme among many Lebanese-American organizations”. She suggests that “Lebanese-American political behavior offers ethnic studies a linkage between identity politics and ethnic citizenship by

contesting the permanency of individual and collective identities and linking voting behavior among ethnic minorities to their broader social identity.”

The final article on contemporary issues “*Pathways to Social Mobility: Lebanese Immigrants in Detroit and Small Business Enterprise*” was written by Sawsan Abdulrahim. Abdulrahim aims at understanding the roots of the Lebanese immigrants’ decision to engage in small-businesses in their new home. She reviews the “middle man” and “the ethnic enclave economy” theories and discusses the role played by social, physical, and economic capital as determinants in these decision making processes. Abdulrahim views these decisions in their relation to structural integration. She argues that “structural conditions and the ability to combine capital resources proved to be extremely important” in the Detroit context. She concludes, with respect to Lebanese small entrepreneurs, that while the move into the business world is the result of hard work and determination, it is likewise “an outcome of the structural discrimination they face and their inability to move into the professions they originally intended to work in.”

As guest editor of this special issue of Palma Journal, I wish to thank the editorial board for putting these pages at my disposal in order to expand discourse on Lebanese migration. In particular, I would like to thank Palma supervising editor, Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous, for initiating this process and accompanying me in the selection of articles and the arduous task of preparing this volume for final publication. I trust that the reader will discover many new insights into the field of empirical migration studies and the ongoing debates on migration theory and that this issue will further dialogue between scholars in the West and those in the Middle East.

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Lebanese-Americans' Identity, Citizenship And Political Behavior

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Abstract

The identity of Lebanese-Americans as members of an ethnic group is sometimes counterposed to their status as American citizens. This article investigates how does the manner by which Lebanese-American identify themselves impact their political engagement? This research is guided by three hypotheses— (1) Lebanese cultural identification is strongly prevalent among Lebanese-American immigrants and descendents; (2) Lebanese-Americans political mobilization is likely to be contingent upon, and associated with, politics in Lebanon and American relations towards it; (3) Lebanese-Americans contextualize their political activism within the Arab-American framework in promoting their community's interest, but they separate themselves from other Arab-Americans in their fight for Lebanese issues. Empirical findings from national surveys and online content analysis suggest that Lebanese Americans express their political participation by directing their activism towards issues related to Lebanon and their hyphenated American community, as well as general civic and welfare causes.

Keywords: Identity, Lebanese-Americans, citizenship, political engagement, cultural identification, activism, Lebanon, immigrants.

Introduction

I believe you can say to the founders of this great nation, "Here I am, a youth, a young tree, whose roots were plucked from the hills of Lebanon, yet I am deeply rooted here, and I would be fruitful." It is to be proud of being an American, but it is also to be proud that your fathers and mothers came from a land upon which God laid His gracious hand and raised His messengers.

Khalil Gibran's inspirational speech, captured in the First Issue of *The Syrian World* on July 1926 (Øverland, 2000), presents a challenge that faces Lebanese American citizens in the world of globalization and transnationalism. As ethnic citizens, they often struggle to balance between devotion to their American citizenship and celebration of their Lebanese ethnic heritage. This balance becomes harder in instances of clash between their ethnicity and nationality as results of international conflicts and politics. This paper attempts to address the following questions: How have Lebanese-Americans expressed their identities as ethnic citizens of the United States in their political participation? And does the manner by which Lebanese-American identify themselves impact their political engagement?

Identity is particularly important to the study of citizenship. According to Hussain and Bagguley (2005: 409), citizenship and identity “are counterposed to one another. The former expresses universal individual rights and duties, while the latter implies particularism and group membership.” The identity of Lebanese-Americans as members of an ethnic group is sometimes counterposed to their status as American citizens. By focusing on Lebanese-Americans’ political behavior, this article examines the impact of identity politics on the exercise of citizenship status of an ethnic minority. It is guided by the following three hypotheses, (1) Lebanese cultural identification is strongly prevalent among Lebanese-American immigrants and descendants; (2) Lebanese-Americans political mobilization is likely to be contingent upon, and associated with, politics in Lebanon and American relations towards it; (3) Lebanese-Americans contextualize their political activism within the Arab-American framework in promoting their community’s interest, but they separate themselves from other Arab-Americans in their fight for Lebanese issues.

To answer the research questions and examine this study’s hypotheses, a brief overview of the historical and demographic characteristics of the Lebanese American community is presented. Several perspectives are then offered to illuminate how Lebanese Americans identify themselves and how they are labeled by others. The varying perspectives on identifying Lebanese Americans affect their ethnic citizenship status and lead to a wide range of outcomes and classifications as a diaspora, a minority or a category of immigrants. As an outcome of ethnic citizenship status, political activism is then analyzed by exploring Lebanese advocacy and political, ethnic and transnational organizations as well as their political behavior and participation, such as voting and contributing to political campaigns.

A. The Lebanese Community in the United States

For many years, scholars have studied various aspects of Arabs and Lebanese’s social, cultural and political lives in the United States. Examples include studies in the sixties (e.g. Abdo A. Elkholy, 1966), the seventies (e.g. Mehdi , 1978 and Kayal, 1975), and many more in the eighties (Abraham and Abraham, 1983; Abu-Laban and Suleiman, 1989; Hooglund, 1987; Kayal, 1985; McCarus, 1994; Naff, 1985 and Orfalea, 1988). Despite the contribution of this body of literature on Americans of Arab and Lebanese heritage, a lack of clarity on their status as an ethnic minority in the United States persists.

Lebanese-Americans have been in the United States since the early 1870s but have been historically categorized as Greeks, Turks or Syrians (Suleiman, 1999). Those who came in the early 1880s from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine were considered immigrants from the encompassing “Greater Syria” region in the Ottoman Empire. As of 1920, Over 200,000 “Syrians” had come from impoverished villages under the Ottoman occupation. Working mostly in peddling, Lebanese were confused with other “undesirable” groups and were

often called *dago*, *sheeny*, or *turk* (Samhan, 1987: 15). They ranked second after the Chinese in being most "foreign" of all immigrants (Samhan, 1987: 13); and in the segregated south, they were discriminated against for being "colored," Catholic, and foreign (Samhan, 1987: 11 italic in original).

The early immigrants' political experience may be characterized as a struggle for legal recognition, further assimilation and greater integration. In 1910, the U.S. federal government attempted to deal with Syrians' eligibility for citizenship. "Syrian" immigrants presented a complex case for their identification with "Asia Minor," having a swarthy complexion, being from the continent of Asia, but not considered "free white persons" or of African descent/birth (as determined by a 1909 legal order of the Georgia court) (Samhan, 1987: 14). In response to heightened cases of discrimination, the Syrian community protested by forming a delegation of the "Association of Syrian Unity" to represent the community in Washington, D.C. in its battle to historically and genealogically argue that Syrians, as Semites, were Caucasian. In 1914, a South Carolina judge ruled that while Syrians might be free white persons, they were not the whites to whom act of Congress (in 1790) had extended the privilege of citizenship. Syrian civic institutions later succeeded in petitioning the higher court to reverse that decision as well (Samhan, 1987: 14-5). By the end of World War II, as the concept of the nation-state spread beyond Europe and North America and reached to the previously colonized continents of Asia, Africa and South America, Lebanese-Americans were then recognized based on their country of origin, Lebanon.

Today, a significant number of American citizens are of Lebanese heritage although the number of those who identify themselves as such is much smaller (Ajrouch, 2000; Majaj, 2000). The Lebanese-American community, whose numbers range between half a million (US Census Bureau, 2005) to nearly 1.3 million (Arab-American Institute), comprise up to one-fifth of the Lebanese global diaspora. The US Census Bureau reported in 2000, that one fourth of Arab-Americans are of Lebanese heritage. However, data collected by the Arab-American Institute claims this percentage to be higher (39%). At least 76% of Arabs in America are Christians (42% Catholic; 11% Protestant; 23% Eastern Orthodox) and 24% are Muslims (Arab American Institute). Although a formal study has not been conducted on their religious makeup, Christians are generally represented at greater rates among Lebanese-Americans than Arab-Americans.

Lebanese-Americans' socioeconomic and demographic traits are close to the average American standards than are other Arab-Americans'. Many of them speak only English at home, 53.5% compared to 31.3% of Arab-Americans. The majority of them were born in the United States (64.5%), and only 23.3% of them were naturalized American citizens. Lebanese-Americans' participation in the labor force is 73.7% for men and 50.3% for women. These rates are higher than the labor force participation of other Arab-American men and women (men 73.3% and women 45.5%). By comparing their labor participation to the general

United States population, men's rates are higher than the national average (which is at 70.7%), but women's rates are lower than the national average (which is at 57.5%). The median earnings for Lebanese-Americans (men US\$49,134 and women US\$32,296) are higher than earnings for other Arab-Americans (men US\$41,687 and women US\$31,842) and even higher than national average (men US\$37,057 and women US\$27,194) (US Census Bureau, 2005). Lebanese-American historical and demographic data suggest that a number of them have been well integrated in the mainstream American society, especially among the descendents of early immigrants. As several new waves of Lebanese immigrants reached the United States in the last sixty years, many of the early waves had already been well assimilated to American culture and assumed its melting pot creed (Nagel and Staeheli, 2003). Descendents of early immigrants, who were completely assimilated¹ into American society and politics, stepped outside the boundaries of their immigrant communities and became more involved in mainstream politics and institutions. A significant number of them have been serving in American politics as governors, attorney generals, mayors, state representatives, members of congress, members of city councils, etc. (*Roster of Arab Americans in Public Service & Political Life*, the Arab American Institute). The following engages theory and empirical data in addressing the impact of this integration on the construction of Lebanese-Americans' identities as ethnic citizens.

B. Contextualizing Lebanese-American Identity

The context of American multicultural democracy has made Lebanese-American's political participation possible. The United States has often been regarded as a successful melting pot where "one's original ethnic background is regarded as largely irrelevant to one's acceptability as a loyal citizen of standing within the nation-state" (Sidanius et al., 1997: 103). Despite the fact that "whites" or rather "Euro-Americans" are the dominant group in American society, ethnic Americans are given the opportunity to "use ethnicity to create resources such as group solidarity and political organizations to facilitate their full participation in American society" (De la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia, 1996:337).

Ethnic representation is not merely the inclusion of people that differ from the rest of society in terms of language and tradition but "rather the result of a process in which such differences are deemed socially and politically meaningful and are acted upon" (Vermeersch, 2003: 886). Ethnic groups' political participation is especially important in offering politicians better information to guide their policy preferences and inclinations. They provide reliable information about their community's political preferences and ensure government's legitimacy and fair practice among minorities in general (Fennema and Tillie, 1999). This rings true to the Lebanese-American experience as demonstrated in November 1991 when President George Bush asked a group of

Arab-American leaders to intervene as peace promoters in the Arab world (Shain, 1994: 818).

Scholars have attempted to understand the contradiction lying in combining ethnicity and citizenship. Kymlicka (1998) has described this type of citizenship as “differentiated.” He contends that in “a society that recognizes group-differentiated rights, the members of certain groups are incorporated into the political community not only as individuals, but also through the group, and their rights depend, in part, on their group membership” (1998: 167). While in Kymlicka’s diverse society, any group qualifies for differentiated citizenship status, Ong (1996) posits that culture is a strong deterrent of what constitutes this differentiation. To Ong, “cultural citizenship” refers to “the cultural practices and beliefs produced out of negotiating the often ambivalent and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms that establish the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory.” Therefore, cultural citizenship is a “dual process of self-making and being-made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and civil society” (Ong 1996: 738). Ong recognizes that cultural citizenship is the result of a group’s contestation and activism to recognize its differences as acceptable norms within the hegemonic discourse. Kymlicka affirms this thought in explaining that “the demand for representation rights by disadvantaged groups is a demand for *inclusion*” (1998: 169 italic in original). Yet, recognizing cultural differences is problematic for American society because its culture and politics were “not organized around a specific ethnically-based nationality, as were European countries, but rather a more generalized one — American” (Renshon, 2001, 24). Geographical, ethnic, racial, and religious diversity are all elements in the makeup of this society through which all groups are “given a chance to become Americans ‘though not always unambivalently’” (Renshon, 2001: 24).

This unambivalence is what marks the problem in compromising Arab- and Lebanese-Americans’ identities with their American citizenship. Arab- and Lebanese- Americans are continuously constructed as “symbolic foreigners” with the persistence of political and ideological conflicts between the United States and the Middle East (Similar to the experience of ethnic Slovenians after the breakup of the former Yugoslav republics, Zorn, 2005). Yet, their personal outlook on their own identity, or even identities, offers a positive dimension to contextualizing their citizenship. The following is an overview of the divergence between Lebanese Americans’ own construction of their identity and how they are labeled by their Lebanese and American compatriots as a diaspora, minority group or a group of new immigrants.

a. Lebanese-Americans Personal Identity

According to Max Weber (1968), an individual’s identity describes the person as s/he exists primarily in the mind of others. Maffesoli (1996) differentiates the feeling of an identity from a person’s identification with a characteristic or a label. The logic of identification is proposed to describe the

establishment of fusional microgroups that tend to favor the disappearance of the difference between the self and the other, the subject and the object. This logic is apparent in the fact that different social aggregations have indefinite contours (e.g. sex, appearance, fashions, and ideologies) and are increasingly defined according to terms that go beyond simple identity.

As a conglomeration of distinct entities, Arab- and Lebanese-Americans face the challenge of determining the circumstances under which they desire to be treated as one unit or be distinguished one from the other. Their ideological, cultural and religious diversities have been a major obstacle in identifying them as one monolithic group (just like the case with Asian-Americans according to Tam, 1995), even during times of threat. Despite their high assimilation trends, Lebanese-Americans have maintained strong ethnic identity and have been able to politically mobilize members of their community to support Lebanese as well as Lebanese-American causes.

The manners by which Lebanese-Americans identify themselves vary according to historical, political, ideological, and cultural factors. For instance, the Lebanese village from which some people descend, and the time they immigrated to the United States, affect their likelihood and desire to assume the Lebanese identity or express it publicly. Historically, the early Arab-American community had neither a strong national identity nor advocacy institutions as did other early immigrant groups. However, they did retain some aspects of the cultural identification, particularly in the area of food and music (Hagopian, 1976: 104). Alternatively, new immigrants, who arrived after the conception of modern political ideologies such as Arab Nationalism and Pan-Arabism, came with a strong and distinct sense of their Arab national identity.²

Official interest in identifying Arab and Lebanese-American did not materialize until after the first Iraqi war and was later reflected in 2000 when the United States Census Bureau became interested in tallying its Arab-American community. To address the hurdles associated with “the lack of consensus on the definition of an Arab ethnic category” (The Arab Population: 2000 *Census 2000 Brief* December 2003), the Bureau developed its own classification. Members of the Lebanese community were classified as Arab-Americans to “reflect [their] involvement in a Lebanese community or only a memory of Lebanese ancestors several generations removed” (US Census Bureau 2000). The Arab-American identity was bestowed on Lebanese and other ethnic groups who have “ethnic origin, descent, roots, heritage, or place of birth of the person or of the person’s ancestors” from a country in the Middle East. The Bureau tried to establish the point at which respondents “had a connection to and self-identified with a particular ethnic group...” However, it did not measure “the degree of attachment to a particular ethnicity” (US Census Bureau 2000).

While some Lebanese have attempted to assert their identities as Arab-Americans, others have distanced themselves from identifying as such. Regardless, the United State Census bureau report, which was written mostly by

non-Arab- and non-Lebanese-American scholars, overlooked self-identification of some Lebanese-Americans and compiled them all in one group:

“For the purposes of this report, most people with ancestries originating from Arabic-speaking countries or areas of the world are categorized as Arab. For example, a person is included in the Arab ancestry category if he or she reported being Arab, Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese, Middle Eastern, Moroccan, North African, Palestinian, Syrian, and so on. It is important to note, however, that some people from these countries may not consider themselves to be Arab, and conversely, some people who consider themselves Arab may not be included in this definition” (US Census Bureau 2000).

Beyond the discussion of identity and identification, Lebanese-Americans' status as ethnic citizens is yet to be defined and outlined. The subject is complicated and multifaceted, and no consensus is yet reached: From the American perspective, should Lebanese and Arabs be classified as ethnic minorities, they would qualify for certain entitlements and considerations. From the Lebanese perspective, to classify Lebanese-Americans as a group among many of the Lebanese Diasporas, serves the cause of maintaining emotional and material connections with Lebanon as a homeland. However, labeling Lebanese-Americans as a diaspora, an ethnic minority or “new immigrants,” reflects the divergent perspectives on their identity, mobility, loyalty, and rights.

b. One of Many Lebanese Diasporas?

Diaspora-ism is a concept that reflects feeling of in-between-ness, dual loyalties, and lack of authenticity. This concept is explored therein from three following perspectives. The first perspective is that of the country of origin which considers them a displaced community and is reflected in defining diaspora as “a form of social relations produced by the displacement from home. It implies a very conventional anthropological perspective on social life, the persistence of tradition (identity) despite its displacement from place of origin... Diaspora identity is constituted against the national society out of a sense of loss and conditional belonging” (Humphrey, 2004:32). Lebanese-Americans are viewed as “Americanized” for having lost their connections to their roots and authentic Lebanese culture and language.

The term diaspora has been applied to Lebanese-Americans not only by members and researchers in their country of origin, Lebanon, but also in questions such as “where is home,” or “when are you going home,” that are often asked of Lebanese-Americans by their American compatriots. From the American perspective, Lebanese-Americans may be considered as “not quite Americans,” especially when conflict with or in the Middle East heightens. In this sense, Mattar's definition (2004) best represents this perspective. According to Mattar:

“The term *diaspora* is derived from the Greek verb *speiro* (to sow) and the Greek preposition *dia* (over). All diasporas have in common significant characteristics: They result from both voluntary and imposed migration; their members wish to and are able to maintain their ethnonational identity, which is the basis for continued solidarity; core members establish in their host countries intricate organizations that are intended to protect the rights of their members and to encourage participation in the cultural, political, social, and economic spheres; and members maintain continuous contacts with their homelands and other dispersed segments of the same nation” (Mattar 2004).

Diaspora’s loyalty and patriotism become the center of questions and scrutiny especially during wartime. The notion of in-between-ness reflects the diaspora presence in a “host country” and assumes a temporary status for the group. From an American perspective, Lebanese-Americans may be considered as “not quite Americans,” especially when conflict with or in the Middle East heightens.

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A third definition suggests a certain level of autonomous transnational identity. Shain (1994: 814) views diaspora as a political group of people “with common national origin who reside outside a claimed or an independent home territory. They regard themselves or are regarded by others as members or potential members of their country of origin (claimed or already existing), a status held regardless of their geographical location and citizen status outside their home country.” In sum, Lebanese-Americans have been identified as a diaspora, although the assimilated ones have a harder time accepting this identity than recent immigrants do. As a displaced group, due voluntary or imposed immigration, or as an independent political group, the Lebanese American diaspora has not reached the legal resolution to its identification problem.

c. Not Quite a Minority

Although Arab-Americans are not yet considered legally as one group, they are often addressed as a symbolic minority group. Morrison defines a minority as “a legally protected group identified by ethnicity or race” (Morrison

1987: 224). Arab- and Lebanese-Americans are thus a symbolic, rather than a legal, minority because their group rights are not formally protected. The *United State Census report on The Arab Population: 2000*, which was issued in compliance with the revised federal standard for the classification of race and ethnicity, determined that the Office of Management and Budget was unable to reach consensus about the definition of "an Arab ethnic category" (*Federal Register* 1997: 58787).

Samhan (1987: 26) emphasizes that Arab-Americans' exclusion from ethnic politics and the right to act as a constituency "is not so much by ignorance or prejudice as by political design." It is unclear whether the mis-categorization of American citizens with Middle Eastern heritage, by the United State Census Bureau, is motivated by a specific political agenda or by lack of one. What is clear is the positivistic approach under which this categorization was done in an ahistorical context. The Bureau classifies Kurds and Berbers as Arabs, although they do not consider themselves as such whereas citizens from Mauritania, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Comoros Islands were not classified as Arabs although their countries of origin are members of the League of Arab States (US Census 2000). This confusion and resistance to classify Arab-Americans as one legal ethnic minority results in depriving the community from attaining special recognitions and liberties that are granted to other ethnic minorities by federal, state and municipal laws.

The motivation for counting Arab-Americans in the 2000 census is questionable. Kertzer and Arel (2002) note that "counting" a minority has served the need for statistical representation as well as the state's need to control the minority and its members. The United States Census Bureau has a practical interest in keeping record of its population and minority groups. However, it has also been known to count population with a "special" interest. For instance, between 1890 and 1970, coinciding with the period when Japan was perceived as an international threat to Western powers, Japanese-Americans were classified under their own ethnic and racial category.

The method of collecting data on Arabs in America and the accuracy of the responses are also questionable. In their first count of Arab-Americans, the Bureau found that 1,202,871 Americans claim their ancestry from an Arabic-speaking country. Estimates of Arab-Americans have ranged between 1,522,835 according to the American Taskforce for Lebanon (ATFL)³ to over three millions reported by Zogby International's "Arab American Survey," on May 28, 2002. The discrepancy in the Bureau's estimates reflects the under-reporting of the Lebanese- and Arab-American communities who fear that revealing their identities to the Bureau could be shared with other governmental entities such as the FBI or the CIA for adverse purposes. After the first Gulf War and the terrorist incidents in the United States (e.g. Oklahoma, and the World Trade Center), being known as Arab, Muslim, or Lebanese in the United States became associated with the risk of being included in "the special population" of Middle Eastern terrorists category. In sum, while a significant number of Lebanese-

Americans do consider themselves as an ethnic minority, they disagree among themselves and with official American descriptions over the manner of their classification (as Arab, Middle Easterners or Lebanese) and the costs and benefits of their ethnic identification.

d. “New Immigrants”

“New immigrants” is a category that classifies ethnic Americans based on their date of entry to the United State and their country of origin. New immigrants are those who have arrived after 1960’s and from a wide “array of nations and cultures... mainly from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America” (Foner, 2001). In her study on the experience of Palestinian Americans, Christison (1989) reveals that “America often demands more of its immigrants than it does of its native-born citizens,” and that “Unlike native-born Americans, immigrants must eschew criticism of any aspect of the American system or risk being though ungrateful, and they must submerge interest in foreign causes or risk being regarded as of questionable loyalty” (1989: 19). Despite their presence in the United States for other two decades, Lebanese- and Arab-Americans are considered new immigrants. Likewise, their patriotism is challenged although their political and civic engagements are relatively high.

The majority of those who identified their ancestors as Lebanese arrived to the United States after 1965. The table below shows the percentage distribution of American foreign born by year of entry to the United States (US Census Bureau 2005). This data does not account for the assimilated individuals who neglect to acknowledge their Lebanese heritage or those who intentionally hide it:

| | Before 1970 | 1970- 1979 | 1980- 1989 | 1990- 2000 |
|-----------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Total Foreign Born | 15.4 | 15.1 | 27.2 | 42.4 |
| Arab | 9.6 | 17.4 | 27.0 | 46.0 |
| Lebanese | 11.6 | 23.2 | 33.6 | 31.7 |

The claim that Lebanese-Americans are new is a solid argument as the data above shows. The majority of them arrived after 1980s (65.3%) as a direct result of the political crisis in Lebanon. The Lebanese civil war between 1975 and 1990 displaced many people around the world and forced them to seek refuge in countries like the United States and Canada. These immigrants were not necessarily motivated “by political choice but simply because there is nowhere else to go” (quote adopted from a study on Palestinian-Americans by Christison 1989: 19). The continuous political instability and economic hardship in Lebanon is responsible for the continuous Lebanese immigration to the United States and elsewhere despite the mistreatment of post 9-11 immigrants in these host countries.⁴ In sum, the new immigrants’ identity places Lebanese- and

Arab-Americans among other new comers whose roots are not as deeply entrenched in the American soil. Some Lebanese, including those who have been in the United States for many generations, maintain their immigrant connection and recreate their "little Lebanese village" wherever they live. Hence, this approach to identifying them is valid but only on temporary bases. Eventually all new immigrants have to gain a permanent status either as a diaspora (like the Jewish community) or as a minority group (like the Japanese). It is noteworthy that all three groups, Jews, Japanese and Arabs are comparable in size and represent 3% of the total American population.

Group membership and identity offer one perspective on how Lebanese-Americans live out their citizenship. They are viewed by some as members of a worldwide Lebanese diaspora, by others as a stream of new immigrants arriving in the United States after the 1960s and yet a third categorization puts them in an ambiguous ethnic and/or racial category that is subjectively defined. These views of Lebanese-Americans, along with their own definition of their hyphenated identities, influence the choice they make in their political activism.

B. Political Activism and Institutions

While a set of scholars define citizenship in terms of membership, others, specifically communitarians, feel that it is really all about participation, "citizens are who they are by virtue of participating in the life of their political community and by identifying with its characteristics" (Sharif, 1998: 10). Citizens' political participation has been an integral part of the foundation of many democracies since ancient Greece (Pocock 1987 and Weber 1976). In that sense, citizenship is better defined as a "forum where people transcend their differences and think about the common good of all citizens" (Kymlicka, 1998: 168). It is within this forum of civiness that Lebanese Americans contest to be included in forming the public good. They contest to participate partly because of the symbolic foreignness imposed upon them.

The incident of September 11th and the American war on terrorism have put Lebanese- and Arab-Americans in an awkward position. Barger posits that in wartime, when "a particular prefix... coincides with the name of an enemy nation [it tends to]... stigmatize rather than Americanize its bearer" (Barger 1991 quoted in Shain, 1994: 818). But not all minorities are alike in that sense: The American Jewish community has "always portrayed its devotion to Israel (the symbolic homeland) as an extension of its allegiance" (Shain, 1994: 814), whereas Arab- and Lebanese-American political activism is perceived as suspicious.

Arabs in the United States are subject to two types of discriminations from which minorities in the modern, secular, pluralistic, nation-state often suffer. The first type is internal discrimination that may legally or illegally deprive citizens from their rights, and the second type is external, which results from international conflicts. The latter type "is complicated by the fact that even

with constitutional guarantees to all citizens, the discrimination finds a ‘legitimacy’ in pronouncements of national scrutiny, and thus segments of the citizenry may support and condone it rather than view it as a denial of rights” (Hagopian, 1976: 100). This discrimination against Arab- and Lebanese-Americans finds legitimacy in legal codes such as the Patriot Act and in the lack of cultural sympathy and acceptance among the general public.

Despite the challenges of the post September 11, 2001, Arab- and Lebanese-Americans continued to feel proud of their hyphenated identity. A Zogby International survey of 701 Arab- American voters in four states during October 6-10, 2006, shows that Arab-Americans give high consideration to the conditions of their ethnic citizenship in the United State (Arab-American Institute 2007). In response to a question on whether respondents considered themselves to be “more proud, less proud, or have the same amount of pride in being an Arab-American as [they] did ten years ago?” answers were as follows:

Pride in Arab American Heritage vs. 10 Years Ago (Arab American Institute 2007)⁵:

| | Overall | Dem | Rep | Ind | 18 - 29 | 65+ | US Born | Not US Born | Cath | Prot | Mus |
|---------------|---------|-----|-----|-----|---------------|-----|------------|-------------------|------|------|-----|
| More Pride | 26 | 26 | 22 | 32 | 47 | 31 | 26 | 29 | 26 | 18 | 42 |
| Less Pride | 17 | 21 | 15 | 14 | 11 | 13 | 17 | 21 | 17 | 17 | 20 |
| Same Pride | 51 | 50 | 60 | 45 | 36 | 48 | 52 | 45 | 51 | 59 | 33 |
| Not Sure | 6 | 3 | 3 | 10 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 |

As the table shows, the overall pride in Arab-American heritage has remained the same in 2007 as it was in 1997. The majority of Arab-American Democrats and Republicans continued to feel as proud of their heritage as they did ten years ago. Likewise, the majority of those born in the United States as well as those born elsewhere demonstrated a strong sense of continuity. Both Protestants and Catholics affirmed this continuity as well. However, surprising responses were given by Muslim Arab-Americans and those between the ages of 18 and 29. Both groups reported an increased sense of pride since 1997, 42% and 47% respectively. While the causes of this surge of pride among these two groups are worth investigating, the scope of this article is concerned with answering the following question: has this pride led to empowering Lebanese- and Arab-Americans to innovatively attract the support of mainstream American public opinion?

Generally, Lebanese Americans have been able to influence mainstream American politics towards Lebanon and change the public opinion about

Lebanese issues and their ethnic status. On the personal level, Lebanese Americans have used their friendships and professional partnerships as a vehicle to introduce their fellow Americans to Lebanon and gain political allies. They have mainstreamed their food and music as a part of the American culture, thus impacting the public opinion indirectly. However, their innovation was not solely cultural and personal but extended to political activism. Kiesler and Pallak (1975) suggest that an innovative minority is capable of changing the judgment of an inconsistent majority.

According to Vermeersch (2003), by maintaining strong ethnic identity, minority leaders have a greater impact on mobilizing their groups politically than by politicizing their concerns and grievances. Political scientists, like Schumpeter (1943), affirm that minority leadership must pursue the goal of forming a minority voting bloc as a mean to influencing political outcomes. Once given sufficient political knowledge, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1988) argue that voters are rational in obtaining controlled political and socially transmitted information.

The Zogby International survey shows that ethnic heritage occupies a significant part in how Arab-Americans identify themselves (Arab-American Institute 2007):

How important is your ethnic heritage in defining you as a person?

| | Overall | Dem | Rep | Ind | 18-29 | 65+ | US Born | Not US Born | Cath | Prot | Mus |
|-----------------|---------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|---------|-------------|------|------|-----|
| Very Import. | 52 | 55 | 50 | 49 | 56 | 56 | 49 | 68 | 57 | 47 | 66 |
| Somehow Import. | 30 | 30 | 28 | 33 | 21 | 24 | 34 | 18 | 29 | 35 | 18 |
| Not Import. | 17 | 14 | 22 | 17 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 11 | 13 | 17 | 13 |
| Not Sure | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | <1 | 4 | 1 | <1 | 3 |

The table above illustrates that ethnicity is overall very important to Arab-Americans in constructing their personal identity. Across the spectrum, Arab-Americans, regardless of their political affiliation (Democrats, Republicans, or Independents), their age group, their religion or place of origin, emphasized their ethnic heritage as very important in defining them as persons. This heritage is still significantly more important to immigrants than those born in the United States (68% to 49%); and it is also more important to Muslims than Christians (66% to 57% among Catholics and 47 among Protestants). It is of equal importance to Arab-Americans of all ages and political ideologies although democrats' score is slightly higher than republicans 55% to 50%. Overall, this data suggest that both Arab-American Republicans and Democrats, who are naturalized citizens and Muslims, are more likely to value their ethnic heritage and align politically in favor of their ethnic citizenship.

Vermeersch (2003) argues that the manner by which a minority frames its mobilization demonstrates their ability to persuade candidates and influence politics by. They do so by locating political compatible discussion partners, and reinterpreting dissonant information in a more favorable light (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988: 480). Lebanese-American advocacy and political organizations have been established to raise voters' political knowledge, attract candidates to support Lebanese causes, and synchronize common interests to form a voting bloc.

a. Political Advocacy Organizations

Establishing advocacy organizations is one of the approaches that Lebanese-Americans follow in framing their mobilization. As early as 1909, leaders of the Syrian community formed the "Association of Syrian Unity" (Samhan 1987: 14-5). Since World War I, the political activism of minority groups and ethnic diasporas has been growing and "the ability of US diasporas to affect American foreign policy toward their homeland has grown (and is likely to expand) because of the greater complexity in distinguishing between America's friends and foes after the collapse of communism" (Shain 1994: 812). According to Vermeersch (2003), by maintaining strong ethnic identity, minority leaders have a greater impact on mobilizing their groups politically than by politicizing their concerns and grievances. Political scientists, like Schumpeter (1943), affirm that minority leadership must pursue the goal of forming a minority voting bloc as a mean to influencing political outcomes. Once given sufficient political knowledge, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1988) argue that voters are rational in obtaining controlled political and socially transmitted information.

Throughout the twentieth century, Lebanese-born immigrants organized two types of associations. The first type reflects people's awareness of their positions as members of the Arab-American community and advocates for favorable American foreign policy towards the Arab world in general. The second type of organizations focuses on American political and economic relations with Lebanon.

On the Arab and Arab-American front, Lebanese-Americans established and contributed to a number of organizations. In 1980, Lebanese-American former Senator James Abourezk founded the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee⁶ (ADC), as "a civil rights organization committed to defending the rights of people of Arab descent and promoting their rich cultural heritage." Likewise, in 1985, Lebanese descendent James Zogby founded the Arab- American Institute⁷ (AAI) "to encourage political participation of Arab Americans and increase the visibility of Arab-American involvement and candidates in the American political system." Lebanese-Americans also participated in the Association of Arab-American University Graduates⁸ (AAUG) which was created in 1967 "to foster better understanding between the Arab and American peoples and promoting informed discussion of critical issues concerning the Arab world and North America."

The second genre of organizations is occupied with issues relevant to Lebanon. The most significant ones include: The American Task Force for Lebanon⁹ (ATFL), which is a club of prominent Lebanese-Americans. With a focus on American foreign policy, ATFL works "towards achieving security, stability, and independence in Lebanon." Similarly, the Council of Lebanese American Organizations¹⁰ (CLAO) is a federation of local, regional, and national Lebanese-Americans organizations. CLAO advocates "sovereignty in Lebanon and friendship between United States and Lebanon." In 2003, four organizations (American-Lebanese Alliance, American-Lebanese Coordination Council, Assembly for Lebanon and Lebanese Information Center) joined efforts to form the American-Lebanese Coalition (ALC).¹¹ This is "a coalition of Lebanese-American groups devoted to promoting and establishing strong relations between the United States and Lebanon." These organizations have been successful, to a certain degree, in securing considerable commitment from several administrations in the United States government to promote Lebanese democracy and sovereignty and pass favorable United Nations' resolutions that achieve these goals. In sum, Lebanese-American organizations that focus their efforts on lobbying and advocating Lebanese causes have been able to benefit Lebanon and to influence American foreign relations with it. Evidence of their achievements includes a number of United Nations and Congressional initiatives passed under American leadership. Alternatively, Lebanese-Americans have been able to outreach and advocate on behalf of their local community by joining efforts with, and framing their political activism within, the Arab-American organizations. Those organizations have mobilized bloc votes and pressured public officials to denounce and condemn violations of Arab American civil and legal rights.

b. Political Behavior and Participation

Arab-Americans struggle to achieve visibility in US politics and gain the support of the American public opinion. Historically, Lebanese- and Arab-Americans have been considered statistically insignificant. Yet, as a political group they have made lasting impressions in the groups to which they belong. Their activism has been channeled through advancing general concerns of mainstream American society, instilling in their ethnic communities a sense of cultural pride and crossing national boundaries to influence social change in the Middle East.

Transnationally, the most active groups of Lebanese- and Arab- American doctors are members in the American-Lebanese Medical Association¹² and the National Arab-American Medical Association.¹³ Lebanese intellectuals are members of the Middle Eastern Studies Association¹⁴ and the Lebanese Studies Association.¹⁵ Their local and national, social and religious clubs are numerous; among their most famous is the Southern Federation of Syrian-Lebanese American Clubs.¹⁶

They are founders and members of advocacy and social groups such as St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), NARAL Pro-Choice America, American Civil Liberty Union, and *Mothers against Drunk Driving* (MADD). They have also lobbied as citizens for civil liberties and as workers in the auto industry against labor discrimination. Arab-American workers reaped the benefit from operating as a part of the general American workers' movement, which did not specifically represent their ethnic interests (Ahmed 1975: 22). Arab-Americans were also a part of the struggles to end the near slavery working conditions in the grape and lettuce fields of California (Georgakas 1975: 17).

In mainstream American politics, they are members of political groups, professional associations and social clubs. Lebanese have been active members of American political parties, including Republican, Democratic and Green. The 2002 Zogby International poll indicated that 43 percent of Arab Americans affiliated themselves with the Democratic Party in 2004, 32 percent with the Republican Party, and 16 percent claimed to be independent (Arab-American Institute 2002).

Since 2000 Arab-Americans have increased their involvement in federal, state, and local elections even during midterm elections. AAI reports that Arab-Americans vote in greater percentages, and are more politically active than average Americans. In recent years, Arab-Americans have been more successful in forming voting blocks and "getting out the vote" (GOTV). According to a 2000 Zogby International poll, 88.5% of Arab-Americans are registered voters and are "a reliable voter group who go to the polls in larger percentages than other groups, they could deliver the difference for candidates who listen to their concerns" (Arab-American Institute 2002).

Like other minority groups, Lebanese- and Arab-Americans have increasingly felt obligated to vote along political lines in favor of their ethnic community and heritage. Bernstein (2001: 28) argues that the likelihood of minorities to vote increases with (a) increases in the concentration of a minority in a geographical area; (b) leaders' efforts to strengthen group identity; (c) the groups' ability to contact constituents, mobilize them and expand their political influence. Examples of African-Americans and Latinos' voting behaviors demonstrate how people feel a special pressure to cast a vote that is loyal to their racial and ethnic groups (Hill and Hurley 1984).

In the 2000 election, minority votes were very crucial to candidates' successes, "The election revealed significant geographical differences in voting patterns and minority vote choices with significant implications for the future" (Andersen 2001: 2068). Arab-Americans were especially important voters for the two major political parties in the 2000 election: both Bush and Gore courted their votes (Arab-American Institute 2002) for they were well represented in 55 congressional districts across the United States, making up between 1.5% and 4.5% of the total voting population.

In the 2000 Presidential election, Arab-Americans gave 45.5% of their vote to George W. Bush, 38% to Al Gore and 13.5% to Nader. In the Congressional race, 43.5% of their votes went to the Democrats and 44% to the Republican (AAI, November 4, 2002). In 2004, Arab-Americans in Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida voted 2 to 1 for Democratic candidate Senator John Kerry (63 %) versus for Bush (28.5%) and Nader (2.5%) (Arab-American Institute 2004). They have also increased their outreach to politicians and other groups. About 100 congressional Candidates participated in Arab American events (AAI, October 31, 2002). The Arab-American Leadership Council PAC (ALCPAC), which was founded to raise money to support Arab-Americans and other qualified candidates in election, also make connections with other ethnic groups concerned about civil rights -- Hispanics, Asians, and African-Americans (Kelleher 2004). Of all Arab-American voting in 2000, 14.5% made financial contributions to a presidential campaign. Channeled through ALCPAC, Fifty-three contributions were made to federal campaigns and twenty-one to non-federal campaigns during the 2000-2002 election cycle reaching \$100,000 (Arab American Institute 2002).

Arab-Americans have also been successful in raising national awareness of political concerns in the Middle East, especially in regards to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 1988, Arab-Americans convinced delegates at ten Democratic state conventions to pass resolutions addressing issues of Palestinian rights and to introduce in July 1988, the Palestinian question at the Democratic National Convention in Atlanta (Barron, 1989: 71). Also in 1988, Arab-American activists were successful in placing referenda on the ballots of four US cities regarding Palestine. "Voters in San Francisco and in Cambridge and Newton, Massachusetts voted on the question of US support for Palestinian statehood while citizens in Berkeley, California were asked if Berkeley should establish a sister-city relationship with a Palestinian refugee camp" (Barron, 1989: 71). Likewise, the subject of Lebanese freedom and security has been raised at several Republican and Democratic National Conventions in the last two decades.

In terms of issues that concern Arab-Americans, an AAI poll revealed that Three-fourths of these voters consider the Middle East as an "important issue" in determining their vote (AAI, November 4, 2002). In response to a Zogby International 2002 Poll question on "How important are the following issues in your vote for Congress?" Arab-Americans responses were as follows: Corruption (80%), the war in Iraq (77%), Civil Liberties (76%), Lebanon (73%), and Palestine (68%).

In sum, Lebanese- and Arab-American political engagement has been rising in response to external and internal challenges. As conflict in the Middle East persists and germinates, Lebanese-Americans have increased their advocacy on behalf of Lebanon. They have been "highly dedicated to political causes in their country of origin, often seeing themselves as representatives of their old country abroad" (Shain 1994: 814). Similarly, they have collaborated,

especially in locales where they are demographically significant, to support other Lebanese- and Arab-Americans with their votes, fundraising and campaigning. Most importantly, Arab- and Lebanese-American activism has been channeled through organizations like AAI and ADC in very effective manners.

Conclusion

This article has shown that heritage is important in constructing the ethnic identity of Lebanese-Americans and influencing their political behaviors. Lebanese-Americans have not yet been given an official status or legal identification in the United States. They are officially classified as members of a larger Arab-American community with many question marks; and are loosely categorized as diaspora, minority, ethnic group, or as “new immigrants.” Nonetheless, they have reconciled their American and Lebanese identities—as Lebanese-Americans, Arab-Americans or *simply* Americans—and expressed both in their political participation by directing their activism towards issues related to Lebanon, their hyphenated American community, or general civic and welfare causes. Their ethnic identity is a significant factor in mobilizing them collectively for the sake of enhancing their local political rights in the United States or affecting American foreign affairs with Lebanon.

In examining the three hypotheses introduced earlier, findings suggest that Lebanese cultural identification is strongly prevalent among Lebanese-Americans across their socioeconomic, political and cultural preferences, especially among Muslim Arab Americans and those between the ages of 18 and 29. However, with the exception of food and music, strong cultural identification as Lebanese was more prevalent among newer immigrants and less significant among descendents of early immigrants. In regards to the second hypothesis, the data has shown that on the one hand, some Lebanese-Americans mobilize in response to Lebanese- American relations; and on the other hand a significant number of them are regular voters and participants in municipal and congressional governments. Their activism extends beyond Lebanese issues as they join with their American compatriots in advancing social justice for all. In terms of political mobilization, this study undermines the accusation of Arab Americans’ “artificial constituency” which is attributed to them by their political opposition by accusing them of being a group of “outsiders.” Yet, Lebanese-Americans genuinely rally for support, recognition and integration in the mainstream politics. The final hypothesis demonstrates that Lebanese-Americans do frame their activism within the Arab-American framework in promoting their hyphenated community’s interest. They are, however, very particular when they promote Lebanese interests in the United States. Lebanese sovereignty and independence seems to be a common theme among many Lebanese-American organizations.

This sociological study shows that ethnic identity and its political expression are framed internally but are also determined externally. The

behavior of Lebanese-Americans within the larger political framework illustrates a nuance in the political spectrum in studying members of an ethnic-identity-under-threat as they negotiate for recognition, inclusion and participation. This case of Lebanese-American political behavior offers ethnic studies a linkage between identity politics and ethnic citizenship by contesting the permanency of individual and collective identities and linking voting behavior among ethnic minorities to their broader social identity.

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Endnotes:

¹ While the concept of assimilation applies to immigrants, their descendents are considered native citizens of the United States and beyond the point of assimilation. However, immigrants engage their children in ethnic work to infuse in them a pride of their ethnic heritage and to preserve their cultural background. This ethnic work is exercised less among second and third generation American citizens who are perceived to be completely assimilated. See (Salins, 1997; Gibson, 1988; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001).

² I use Halim Barakat's definition of Arabs as follows (1993: 33): "The great majority of citizens of Arab countries view themselves and are viewed by outsiders as Arabs. Their sense of Arab nationhood is based on what they have in common—namely, language, culture, sociopolitical experiences, economic interests, and a collective memory of their place and role in history. This sense of nationhood is constantly being formed and reformed, reflecting changing conditions and self-conceptions; together these exclude complete separation as well as complete integration."

³ <http://www.atfl.org>

⁴ See for instance, "*International Migration And Terrorism: Prevention, Prosecution And Protection*" at the UC-CIIP Seminar, March 5-6, 2004 by Philip Martin on May 2, 2004
. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rs/printfriendly.php?id=148_0_1_0

⁵ Zogby International surveyed 701 Arab American voters in FL, MI, OH and PA during October 6-10, 2006. The poll, commissioned by the Arab American Institute, has a margin of error of +/- 3.8%.

⁶ <http://www.adc.org/>

⁷ <http://www.aaiusa.org/>

⁸ <http://www.aaug-asq.org/>

⁹ <http://www.atfl.org/>

¹⁰ <http://www.clao.us/index.html>

¹¹ <http://www.alcoalition.org/>

¹² <http://www.almamater.org/>

¹³ <http://www.naama.com/>

¹⁴ <http://www.mesa.arizona.edu/>

¹⁵ <http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/khater/lsaweb/introduction.htm>

¹⁶ <http://www.sfslac.org/default.htm>